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FUSING SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: 
JUST ANOTHER EURO-PLATITUDE? 
RICHARD YOUNGS
∗ 
Introduction 
The European Union has routinely and increasingly asserted that it pursues security and 
development as mutually-enhancing policy objectives. Developmental approaches to security 
have long been seen as integral to the EU’s distinctive international identity. Now this appears 
to be backed up by firmer policy commitments and new instruments. European policy-makers 
proclaim a two-way link between development and security to be an increasingly core tenet of 
EU foreign policy. They insist that this defines European strategies in Africa, the Balkans, the 
Middle East and more broadly within interventions such as that undertaken in Afghanistan. The 
link occupies centre stage within the EU’s seminal Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) 
commitments and is ostensibly integral to the generic design of European policies towards 
‘fragile states’. 
While widely praised, this rhetorical commitment to link development and security is in itself 
unremarkable: would anyone contend that insecurity and raging conflict were good for 
development, or conversely that poverty was good for conflict mitigation?
1 The pertinent issue 
is whether it has actually changed anything in terms of policy. Has development policy become 
more security-sensitive? Has security policy incorporated concrete development components? 
Or is this strand of PCD simply a question of assuming that anything beneficial for development 
is good for security, and vice versa? 
This paper reveals that the EU has made some modest progress towards according concrete 
substance to the security-development link. In particular, an increased focus on supporting 
governance reforms acts as a potential link between security and development objectives within 
several layers of European policies. However, what the link means in practice is still contested. 
Few in the EU would doubt that security and development go together; but differences abound 
over what this implies for the allocation of finite resources and the nature of diplomatic 
engagements.  
The EU still has no clearly thought-out vision of the balance or direction of causality between 
these two policy goals, but rather an ad hoc approach based on the rather easy assumption that 
‘all good things go together’. Indeed, some basic differences have emerged over where the 
boundary now lies between ‘development’ and ‘security’ policies. The evidence from European 
policies suggests that development and security can be both complementary and oppositional. A 
precarious balance, and some tension, exists between the notion of security-informed 
development, on the one hand, and development-mediated security, on the other hand.  
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1.  The security-development commitment 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) includes a focus on traditional security issues – the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the need for tighter control of the movement and 
financing of transnational criminal networks, and counter-terrorist cooperation with security 
forces in developing states. Its central thesis, however, is built around a three-way linkage 
between security, development and governance reform. This conjoins the development-security 
linkage that had gradually emerged within conflict prevention policies with the development-
governance linkage that had taken shape within development policy forums. 
The three-way linkage is reflected in what have become some of the ESS’s most widely quoted 
assertions, namely that:  
•  “poverty and disease…give rise to pressing security concerns”; 
•  “Security is the first condition of development”; 
•  there is a security imperative in addressing the fact that “sub-Saharan Africa is poorer 
today than it was 10 years ago”; 
•  “development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform”.
2  
Debates were taken a step further by the Commission’s proposals on Policy Coherence for 
Development, forwarded in April 2005. These suggested that “Non-development policies 
should respect development policy objectives and development cooperation should, where 
possible, also contribute to reaching the objectives of other EU policies”. The issue at stake was 
to look beyond “the frontiers of development cooperation, and consider the challenge of how 
non-aid policies can assist developing countries in attaining the Millennium Development 
Goals”. The notion of ‘multi-sector stock-taking’ became a leitmotif in Brussels security circles, 
reflecting the interest in ascertaining what was being done to affect the development-security 
linkages propounded in the ESS in different parts of the EU policy-making community.
3  
Commitments were given firmer standing through the European Consensus on Development, 
agreed in 2006 as the first common set of guidelines for European development policies. The 
Consensus reiterates a conviction in the two-way linkage between security and development: 
development is said to be necessary for security; security necessary for development. The 
security-development link will be promoted, it is claimed, both in crisis management and in 
post-crisis contexts. The EU commits itself to making sure that poverty eradication policies 
incorporate a conflict-prevention focus, and to promoting “linkages between emergency aid, 
rehabilitation and long-term development”. In line with the overarching PCD maxim, it is to be 
ensured that all security policies impact positively on development policies and the attainment 
of the Millennium Development Goals. The Consensus affirms that “Insecurity and violent 
conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achieving the MDGs. Security and development 
are important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries”. Development 
efforts are also presented as the means to tackle crime, energy security and environmental 
degradation.  
The key link between development and security is judged to lie in support for democratic 
governance, which is stipulated as “fundamental for poverty reduction” and whose absence is 
part of the “root causes of violent conflict”. The fragility of developing, conflict-prone states is 
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to be addressed “through governance reforms, the rule of law, anti-corruption measures and the 
building of viable state institutions”.
4 At the December 2006 European Council, EU member 
states agreed to have their own national policies monitored with respect to all such linkages. 
And, with the governance agenda in mind, in early 2007 the principle of donors focusing on 
their respective areas of ‘comparative advantage’ was enshrined in a new EU Code of Conduct 
on the Division of Labour in Development Policy.
5 
Although their logic seems unequivocal, these various commitments do not fully specify the 
complexities of the development-security link or give many clues on how this is to be 
articulated in practice. The Consensus contains many obvious diplomatic fudges. A caveat is 
added that such linkages will only be pursued “fully respecting individual Member States’ 
priorities in development assistance”. The Consensus has an ‘all things to all men’ feel to it, and 
fails to specify outcomes where difficult choices or trade-offs are inevitable. Poverty reduction 
is said to remain the absolute priority in allocating resources; but ‘fragile states’ are also to be 
given ‘particular attention’, as are a wider set of middle-income countries (MICs).  
It is impossible to ascertain much from the EU’s formal commitments and policy statements on 
the key questions of prioritisation and sequencing of linkages. The least developed countries 
(LDCs) are said to be the priority, but so are MICs; poverty reduction is said to be the 
overarching priority, but so is conflict resolution; pressing authoritarian regimes for democratic 
governance is said to be the priority but so is ‘local ownership’ on the part of southern 
governments (presumably including those actively resisting democratisation). It is asserted that 
“Development cooperation is one major element of a wider set of external relations, all of which 
are…mutually supportive and not subordinate to each other” – as if trade-offs would never be 
required.
6 This mirrors a broader argument that the EU has developed such an all-inclusive, 
everything-is-related-to-everything concept of ‘security’ that clear operationalisation becomes 
increasingly difficult.
7 
The broad commitment to ensure coherence between development and security in fact 
incorporates two very different sets of policy issues, which reflect different strands of what is 
understood by ‘security’. One set of issues relates to instability, conflict and insecurity within 
developing states themselves, and the problems these pose for economic development. Another 
issue relates to the EU’s own security concerns and the way these are to be assuaged, it is 
claimed, by enhanced development efforts. Both of these strands are present within the 
Consensus and other PCD commitments. The need is stipulated to address conflict and state 
fragility in developing states. But it is also observed that development should contribute to 
broader EU security aims. The second strand remains more contested, more slippery in 
conceptual terms, and the root of NGO and development networks’ fears over ‘securitisation’. 
The policy statements issued so far certainly conflate the two strands in places in a way that 
militates against clarity.  
Hence, in what appears to be a set of fairly straightforward commitments, there is actually a 
twin dynamic present. In terms of conflict prevention/resolution, the assertion is of a firm causal 
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connection between better security engagements and the effectiveness of development efforts. 
But in terms of the wider security agenda, PCD appears to be more of a conceptual battleground 
pitching the development and security communities against each other. For the development 
community, this is about constraining EU approaches to security and the incipient European 
Security and Defence Programme (ESDP) to ensure that these do not undermine development. 
For the security community it is about facilitating a more (and necessarily, in its view) 
politicised set of EU external relations. The security-development nexus remains an uneasy mix 
of mutually enhancing connection; reaction by some to ESDP; and contrasting reaction by 
others to a changed strategic environment.  
2.  Conflict resolution and crisis response 
Assessing the issue of coherence in respect of instances of open conflict invites the question of 
whether the two-way linkage between development and security policies has produced any 
notable policy changes. This can be examined across each direction of the security-development 
link: 
•  First, have development commitments increased in fragile states and been deployed as 
part of a conflict resolution strategy? The basic philosophy has been ritually repeated of 
‘more effort on development is needed for security’. But has this been put into practice?  
•  Second, and in the inverse direction, has EU security engagement backed up development 
aims? Has development funding become more security-aware and dovetailed more tightly 
to specific peace support imperatives?  
The evidence does not allow entirely positive responses to either set of questions.   
2.1  Development-mediated security 
Experts argue that the EU is still not good at coherently and smoothly making the transition 
from short-term crisis response instruments to long-term development instruments, deployed 
specifically and in sizeable fashion specifically as a follow-up to security engagement.
8 It is 
commonly suggested that the EU is still at an early stage in making development assistance 
‘conflict sensitive’.
9 Diplomats lament that the 2006 ‘Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development’ communication has produced little concrete change.
10 An April 2007 European 
Parliament report complained that the poverty dimension of security is still neglected in practice 
at the EU level.
11 
Brussels policy-makers lament that very little expertise on conflict exists within development 
policy-making circles. The Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit set up in the 
European Commission in 2001 admits to having gained no real handle on development issues. 
Policy-makers lament that the general positing of a mutually-enhancing link between security 
and development in conflict resolution strategies has not been developed sufficiently in detail to 
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provide meaningful operational guidance to development officers charged with allocating finite 
resources.  
Officials admit that security-relevant input into country-level development aid programming 
remains negligible. The disconnect with trade-related aspects of development policy also 
persists: attempts floundered, for instance, to incorporate conflict-sensitive variation into the 
EU’s GSP system of trade preferences.
12 Crucially, internal EU debates have focused far more 
on the military-civilian relationship than on the broader development-security link.  
Many in Brussels express concern that, far from providing greater impetus to development 
efforts, new military decision-making structures have taken shape as a separate and competing 
set of institutions. ESDP officials admit that little thought has yet gone into the way that EU 
missions relate to longer-term development processes. The Police Unit in the Council 
Secretariat has few systematic links with aspects of civilian crisis management run through 
other EU institutional structures. Officials acknowledge that decisions are taken militarily on 
ESDP missions, and only then are development, governance or security sector reform (SSR) 
experts consulted as a secondary concern – rather than these latter being integral to conflict-
resolution planning itself.  
This means that traditional security deliberations still cut across the effective use of 
development funding, rather than boosting the latter. For example, discussions on the EU’s code 
of conduct on arms transfers (that take place within the working group COARM) have not 
benefited from linkage to development policy input: the limited progress in tightening up the 
code of conduct is still cited by many as evidence of the hollowness of security-development 
coherence. 
At the national level, significant variation remains in harnessing development resources to 
conflict-resolution objectives. The Netherlands has merged its development agency into the 
foreign ministry, in part to facilitate a more strategic deployment of Dutch assistance. In 2006, 
the Netherlands created an inter-ministerial ‘pool’ for security sector support, incorporating both 
military and development officials. These moves have engendered some backlash, with two of 
the three current parties in the Dutch governing coalition critical of the mixing of development 
and military funding, in particular with regard to the Netherlands’ involvement in Afghanistan. 
In France the development directorate is similarly embedded within the Quai d’Orsay. In sharp 
contrast, Germany’s development agencies (both the BMZ and GTZ) fiercely defend their 
autonomy from the Auswärtiges Amt; EU diplomats revealed that during the German 2007 
presidency this meant that African issues were led through a strongly development perspective, 
making coordination at the EU level harder in this period on the nominal linkage to security.  
The UK has pioneered a formal set of policy-making linkages through its two Conflict 
Prevention Pools, designed to encourage joint Foreign Office-DfID-Ministry of Defence 
programmes. A similar inter-ministerial Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PRU) was created 
in 2005. Between 2001 and 2006 the share of UK development aid going to ‘fragile states’ 
increased from 17 to 33%.
13 However, assessments differ of how effective the Pools have been; 
doubts remain over whether they have in practice enhanced an investment in development-
sensitive conflict mitigation or simply provided the three ministries with funds through which to 
finance whatever policies they were each individually already funding. One critic argues that 
inter-ministerial rivalry has diluted the work of the PRU to the provision of advisory capacity in 
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conflict contexts.
14 Significantly, the creation of similar collective structures at the EU level, 
within which security, development and diplomatic strands of the Brussels policy-making 
machinery would be tasked with designing more ‘joined-up’ initiatives, has not been judged 
possible.  
2.2  Security-informed development 
Conversely, some improvements have been introduced to render development funding more 
security-aware. This can be seen across both long-term policies of conflict prevention and new 
funding for immediate crisis response.   
The 9
th European Development Fund (EDF) makes formal provision for ODA to support 
conflict mitigation initiatives. And funds have been forthcoming for standard conflict resolution 
activities in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone. One 
of the Commission’s largest projects in recent years was a €20 million Rehabilitation 
programme in Northern Uganda. Crucially, the €250 million African Peace Facility (APF) was 
agreed for 2004-07, to coalesce conflict-related funding out of the EDF. Agreement on Article 
11 of the Cotonou accords, which provides a legal base for such conflict funding from the EDF, 
is routinely listed by diplomats as one of the main achievements in the development-security 
linkage – this a provision that one policy-maker suggests “nobody would have agreed to five 
years previously”.  
Under the 10
th EDF it has been agreed to allocate an increased €300 million to the APF for 
2008-10. From 2007, the new Stability Instrument widens the scope for this type of funding, 
additional to the EDF. Particularly notable increases have been forthcoming in Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) funding. In May 2007 commitment was made to 
speed progress in ongoing discussions on the ‘EU concept for strengthening African capabilities 
for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’, launched in June 2006. The EU has 
proposed to develop the French RECAMP military capacity-building programme into an EU 
instrument, and to harness this for enhanced support and training for the African Standby 
Force.
15  
The civilian Rapid Reaction Mechanism, introduced on the back of the ESDP, includes 
provision for the deployment of police, legal and civil administration experts. New ‘task forces’ 
set up for the Balkans and the Great Lakes incorporated all institutional sites working on these 
regions − giving development experts a role alongside democracy and human rights officers, 
conflict management sections, security experts and those responsible for economic policy. Some 
observers suggest that the Commission’s development directorate has begun to engage with 
conflict resolution if only in part to safeguard its own influence as the ‘fragile states’ agenda has 
gained prominence in other parts of the Brussels institutional machinery. 
Overall, however, it is difficult to judge the scale of conflict-mitigation activity as precise 
figures are not collated on how much of the Commission’s various mainstream geographical aid 
budgets go to conflict resolution and peace support operations. One expert argues that the fact 
that such amounts have not been identified itself casts doubt on development-security 
coherence.
16  
The APF has in practice been used as an operational fund to support the African Union (AU) 
mission in Darfur and not as an initiative for longer-term capacity-building, as was originally 
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stated. Outside Commission funding, the limited size of CFSP and ESDP budgets remains a 
perennial fixture of Brussels debates. With the CFSP high representative’s unit operating on a 
shoestring, security interventions often have to be cobbled together through ad hoc national 
contributions. This is something the Council has been keen to use the PCD commitments to 
rectify, but has so far not succeeded in doing. 
While ESDP missions have proliferated, the proclaimed security-development linkage does not 
appear significantly to have increased the EU’s political will to undertake large scale, combat 
military interventions in conflict situations. The Consensus on Development insists that the EU 
‘cannot stand by’ as conflict rages, in part because this undermines its development efforts. But, 
in practice ‘standing by’ remains a European proclivity. If many critics feared that the 
commitment to coherence between security and development would be used as a banner under 
which a far-reaching militarisation of EU foreign policy would occur, to date these concerns 
have not proven justified.  
The EU has instead limited itself to supporting ‘multilateral subsidiarity’, through support for 
the interventions of other organisations, particularly the African Union in the cases of Somalia 
and Sudan.
17 In respect of the latter, the scale of the EU contribution is anyway extremely 
modest relative to the scale of AU-UN mission that would be required to have a significant 
bearing on the conflict in Darfur. The – at this time of writing, prospective – deployment of an 
EU border mission to Chad will have a greater, indirect bearing on the Darfur crisis, in effect 
Europeanising existing French military activities in Chad.  
Under the ESDP, the EU is now moving to create new ‘Battlegroups’, rapidly deployable and 
mobile forces. But it remains to be seen how these will be deployed. Policy-makers agree that 
these actually provide negligible additional capacity. At present only two Battlegroups are likely 
to be deployable simultaneously. For some states the commitment amounts to little more than 
repackaging existing capacity. The Battlegroups do not address the EU’s most acute weakness, 
namely in strategic airlift. One judgement is that the nature and scale of the Battlegroups means 
that these can only be useful for basic crisis-moment protection (of airports, European citizens, 
etc.) and do not offer the prospect of being integrated into longer-term rebuilding and 
development efforts.
18 Experts lament that rather than being used as a de facto strategic reserve 
to help sustain long-term peace-building strategies, the Battlegroups have so far been seen as 
useful for one-off crisis response. The European Gendarmarie agreed upon by five EU member 
states in 2004 has still not undertaken a single operation. One serving minister laments that 
European security capacities still lag behind its development efforts and that in this sense “little 
headway has been made on the practicalities” of linking security and development policies.
19 
In sum, in both directions of the development-security link, progress and tangible policy 
changes have been relatively limited. Indeed, interviews with policy-makers reveal that as this 
link has been placed increasingly at the centre of EU foreign policy it has engendered notable 
discrepancies over basic definitions of what constitutes ‘development’ and what constitutes 
‘security’.  
At one level, this is said to be the very point of PCD: namely, that assessment begins to focus on 
the overall merged commitment to development-and-security, rather than on which individual 
                                                      
17 M. Gibert, Monitoring a region in crisis: The European Union in West Africa, Chaillot Paper no. 98, 
January 2007, p. 30. 
18 C. Mölling, “EU Battle Groups 2007: where next?”, European Security Review 31, December 2006, p. 
7. 
19 João Gomes Cravinho, “The EU’s development policies are still out of step with its security role”, 
Europe’s World, June 2007. 10 | RICHARD YOUNGS 
policy measures are categorised under which of these objectives. Some practitioners point out 
that it is neither surprising nor necessarily undesirable that security players remain focused on 
shorter timeframes and episodic interventions, while development players look to longer-term 
processes of change: a mixture of these two approaches is properly required in many conflict 
scenarios. Moreover, it is significant that the development and security communities are at least 
talking to each other about merged approaches, when previously such would have been 
anathema to both sets of actors. 
Nevertheless, such putative merging has unleashed some basic contentions. For example, some 
policy-makers and experts insist that the EU’s African Peace Facility contribution represents the 
boosted development-oriented component of security policy; others see it as a security deviation 
of development funds. Such contention exists both between and within different member states.  
Some go as far as suggesting that in these contested definitions there is no honest grappling at 
all with the vexed challenge of how genuinely to fuse development and security. Rather, all talk 
of ‘coherence’ is seen as in its very essence driven by each part of the EU policy-making 
machinery simply seeking to obtain greater power and resources.
20  One practitioner observes 
that each part of the multi-layered EU machinery seeks to utilise each new and supposedly 
‘joined up’ bureaucratic initiative as a means of simply boosting its own ‘traditional way of 
doing things’.   
This dynamic has been seen in some very concrete instances. While the Stability Instrument 
would appear formally to provide a widened remit for political funding, a series of legal battles 
has ensued between the Council and the Commission over exactly what type of funding is 
permitted and under whose control – the Commission accusing the Council of a political grab 
for ‘its’ development funds, the Council objecting to the Commission gaining competence in 
peace support funding of certain types. One recent example was over funding for an Ecowas 
small arms programme funded from the Council; the Commission argued that the Council could 
not authorise this as it constituted a ‘development’ matter and took the Council to court. One 
policy-maker admitted that these turf battles often make a mockery of PCD in practice, 
“overshadowing debates on the substance of what coherence really means”. Sceptics also point 
out that the Stability Instrument simply coalesces a range of existing security-related funding 
and repackages such support without any significant overall increase in money. 
3. Country  examples 
While in-depth country case studies lie beyond the scope of this paper, some of the 
shortcomings outlined can be briefly illustrated by reference to some examples of concrete 
conflict scenarios.  
Sierra Leone shows the lack of linkages in both directions. European security engagement has 
been limited. In 2000, the UK asked for troop contributions from other European states: none 
was forthcoming. European governments have declined to add to UK and Commission funding 
in the aftermath of Sierra Leone’s civil conflict. After the 2002 elections and the formal 
cessation of conflict, on a per capita basis Sierra Leone came to receive more generous UK aid 
allocations than any other African country.
21 But the only other European donor making 
available non-negligible amounts of funding to Sierra Leone – the world’s poorest state – was 
the European Commission. London has lamented the lack of commitment from its European 
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partners. Conversely, from the perspective of the Commission and some other states, the UK is 
seen as having shown little interest in consulting or sharing information on Sierra Leone.  
A similar pattern has been witnessed in the Ivory Coast. The Commission released a €250 
million aid package to the Ivory Coast in the middle of this country’s conflict, but no other 
donor has given strong backing to French and Commission engagement. In 2005, France 
allocated Ivory Coast €70 million, Germany apportioned €13 million, but no other European 
government offered more than €4 million.
22 One diplomat observed that the EU has played a 
“limited role” in this case, precisely because of French bilateral involvement. Moreover, British 
policy in Sierra Leone exhibits notable differences to French policy in Ivory Coast, the latter 
more focused on supposedly balanced elite mediation.
23  
In Rwanda, the UK and France have pursued almost diametrically opposed approaches to 
development in a post-conflict scenario. UK (and Dutch) aid increased as the French cut 
assistance. Diplomatic relations between France and Rwanda were broken in 2006, after a 
French court opened proceedings related to the 1994 genocide. France even pushed for 
Commission aid to Rwanda to be wound up. Nigeria is perhaps an even-more striking example 
of a development effort failing to intensify as conflict has deepened. UK bilateral aid has 
increased and in the summer of 2005 the UK pushed successfully for Nigeria to be offered the 
biggest-ever debt relief package. But Nigeria remains the lowest per capita recipient of EU aid 
in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.
24  
Some experts and diplomats insist that European policy in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) provides a more positive case of development-security linkage. One favourable appraisal 
argues that the EU has confounded critics and proved that Operation Artemis – the EDSP 
mission that helped stabilise Bunia in eastern DRC in 2003 – was far from a one-off operation. 
Artemis kick-started a new development cooperation commitment and especially a new focus 
on police training within which the Council and Commission merged their respective 
approaches to security sector cooperation.
25 A €200 million package of development and 
institution-building aid was introduced shortly after Operation Artemis. A second mission was 
deployed for the 2006 elections to help protect UN observers. However, critics lament that the 
EU’s efforts in assisting economic regeneration have remained modest. Of course, Artemis did 
not succeed in creating conditions for sustainable peace, and instability has persisted in the 
DRC. Critics charge the EU with a “failure to better link military crisis management with wider 
peace-building” in the DRC.
26 In practice, there has been little joint planning between security 
and development activities. The 2006 mission was withdrawn even before it was clear what 
would happen politically after the elections.  
Of course, in Sudan the EU has declined directly to intervene. This contrasts with French direct 
military support to the governments in Chad and Central African Republic against Sudanese-
backed rebels – as indicated, it is this military assistance that is currently in the process of being 
Europeanised. Rather the EU has provided financial support and training for the African Union. 
Overall EU aid to Sudan has quadrupled since 2003. But little political pressure has been 
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exerted on the Sudanese government to rein in the Janjaweed militia. Indeed, the stronger 
criticism sometimes appears to have been aimed at the rebel factions that did not sign up to the 
Darfur peace agreement. By 2007, Tony Blair appeared to be the only European leader 
advocating significantly more punitive pressure against the Sudanese government and a no-fly 
zone – although in September new French president Nicolas Sarkozy also promised a firmer 
line from France. The European Parliament has been viscerally critical of the EU’s weakness in 
Dafur. The peace agreement has not unlocked a big investment in long term development and 
institution-building. Persistent violence has rendered redundant the €300 million aid package 
the EU had agreed after the 2004 peace deal. Crucially, the peace deal shared out power but did 
not address underlying governance reform, and in fact was accompanied by additional 
restrictions on NGOs’ ability to receive Western development funds. Some EU donors have 
rather focused on providing assistance for rebel groups, to induce them to sign the peace 
accords, but this cooperation has not proceeded smoothly.
27 
Outside Africa, improvements in the security-development linkage look even more limited. In 
the Palestinian Occupied Territories the EU has been the largest funder of development projects 
for many years, but since 2000 has switched to short-term emergency relief, with long-term 
development projects suffering in consequence. Since the January 2006 election of Hamas, 
funding has only formally been permitted for short-term emergency relief through the 
Temporary International Mechanism. While development programmes have withered, the EU’s 
two security engagements in the Occupied Territories – a police programme and a border 
mission at the Refah crossing – have also ground to a halt.  
The majority European contribution to the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon has been widely 
hailed as a more successful security deployment. But, interestingly, the French government 
insisted that this formally UN mission would be run under a European Force Commander on the 
ground and a European-dominated Strategic Cell in New York. UNIFIL II has in this way been 
kept institutionally separate from the UN agencies in Lebanon working on development and 
longer-term capacity-building. Whatever UNIFIL II’s virtues, the European input to its 
operational procedures has expressly and formally divided security and development 
components rather than united them.  
For well known geopolitical/transatlantic reasons, Iraq is a case where most in the EU have 
declined to assist economic regeneration efforts in pursuit of conflict mitigation. Since 2003 
representatives of the Commission and European governments not part of the US-led coalition 
have strongly rejected the line that ‘development assistance is needed to mitigate the conflict’ in 
favour of the position that ‘security is needed before we invest in development assistance’. Even 
where increased aid allocations have been agreed since 2005, most of these remain unspent in 
practice. New aid commitments now in the pipeline, combined with an apparent willingness of 
the new French government to re-engage in Iraq, could soon warrant a different assessment of 
this case. But serious doubts remain that European governments will want to contribute troops 
to any multilateral force agreed to plug the ‘security capabilities gap’ as and when US forces are 
drawn down.
28 
In Afghanistan policy-makers lament how slow the EU has been in ramping up its development 
efforts on the back of military presence; ‘fighting the Taliban’ has in practice not smoothly led 
into ‘hearts and minds’ civilian initiatives. Belying their name, the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) deployed in Afghanistan in practice continue to be more involved in security 
than reconstruction. NGOs accuse European involvement in the PRTs of leading to a short-term 
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approach that runs against basic development principles. It took the Council five years to send a 
police mission to Kabul, and this then amounted only to a modest 160 officers. Work on the 
judicial system, lead initially by Italy then the Commission, has been lacklustre. Amidst 
domestic sensitivity, governments in Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain have either 
indicated an intention to scale back operations in Afghanistan or refused to loosen operating 
restrictions on their troops. (Conversely, statements from Nicolas Sarkozy indicate a possible 
change of direction in French policy in favour of boosting France’s troop deployment in 
Afghanistan.  
Significantly, it is in the Balkans that really significant amounts of Commission regeneration 
funding have been forthcoming as accompaniment to security engagement. While the EU has 
(belatedly, perhaps) invested heavily in a comprehensive range of economic and social 
initiatives in the Balkans, this should be seen more as a showcase for ‘integration into EU 
structures as conflict mitigation’ rather than ‘development as conflict mitigation’ in the strictest 
sense. The largest share of European aid in the Balkans is designed to help states comply with 
their commitments under the Stabilisation and Association process to harmonise a vast array of 
legislation with the EU acquis. Development NGOs have been critical of this focus on the 
Balkans, arguing that it provides evidence that the security-development link is essentially about 
diverting poverty relief into support for Western strategic objectives in middle-income states.  
4.  The wider security agenda 
Beyond the matter of discreet conflict interventions is the question of whether overarching 
approaches to EU security have become more development-sensitive and helped unlock greater 
effort and resources for economic modernisation. In a formal sense, there would seem much 
positive change to report on this issue. 
European governments and diplomats have constantly claimed that the lesson they took from 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was that the underlying roots of terrorism and 
international instability lay in economic and political under-development. Security threats have 
increasingly been seen as deriving from shortfalls in ‘human security’. While many European 
governments have made such a link rhetorically since the mid-1990s, in the wake of 9/11 the 
focus on implementing such logic has been strengthened, and states previously adhering to more 
traditional containment-oriented security approaches appear to have shifted positions. 
EU foreign policy high representative Javier Solana suggests that even if development and 
reform cannot be expected immediately to assuage the most implacable of terrorists, the latter 
have been “nourished by a pool of disaffection” engendered by prevailing social and economic 
conditions.
29 At this level, EU efforts to develop more holistic and effective security policies in 
the wake of 9/11 offer significant potential for development aims. The prospect arises of 
security concerns unlocking additional resources for development and of the development 
community gaining purchase over broader foreign policies. One example of where counter-
terrorist concerns have led to significant increases in development funding is Pakistan. 
However, even if such new security thinking and concerns have helped unlock a commitment to 
increased development aid, some in the EU do not welcome this. Doubts arise to the extent that 
such resources are not tightly targeted on the poorest developing states but include increased 
commitments to middle income states where security issues are at stake. If 9/11 and its 
aftermath have reinforced some development efforts in the Middle East, this is welcomed and 
pressed forward by some development ministries (the French and Spanish) but viewed critically 
by others (DfID): the former see this as the archetypal way in which security and development 
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should indeed merge, the latter see it as one element of a worrying prevalence of security over 
development.  
There has been no mass diversion of aid resources away from the poorest states to the new 
strategic front-line of the Middle East; by far the biggest share of promised increases in 
European ODA have been ring-fenced for Africa (although the latter’s share of EU aid has 
decreased slightly in recent years). However, some increases in resources have undoubtedly 
reflected approaches to security that have little to do with development, and could be interpreted 
as diverting resources away from development aid. This applies particularly to significant new 
allocations for controls against illegal migration; new programmes of technical assistance for 
anti-terrorist cooperation with developing countries; and costly new security patrol initiatives, 
especially in the Mediterranean. In 2005 the European Parliament took the Commission to court 
in relation to the use of development funds for border management in the Philippines (a case 
that still has to be decided). The Commission’s recent proposals suggest that ‘dialogue between 
cultures’ should be supported as part of the security-development link
30 – this is the type of 
agenda-expansion that clearly feeds sceptics’ fears of resources being diverted into strategically-
motivated initiatives that have no discernible utility for the success of EU development policy.   
The emergence of security-linked conditionality also risks cutting across development priorities.  
New anti-terrorism clauses have been included in third country agreements and have held up a 
number of deals. And of course WMD-related conditionality has increasingly dominated in 
states such as Syria, Libya and Iran, blocking or even reversing EU development engagements. 
New provisions have been introduced for taking action against states not cooperating on illegal 
immigration – even if France and Sweden blocked a clause expressly providing for the complete 
suspension of aid and trade in such circumstances. Partner states have also been pressed to agree 
extended ‘readmission agreements’.
31 During his time as EU counter-terrorist coordinator, Gijs 
De Vries was accused by both security and development circles of having focused only on a 
narrow set of justice and home affairs issues. The EU’s ‘softness’ on the Sudanese government 
at least in part reflects a desire to maintain counter-terrorist cooperation with a key information 
source on Al Qaeda. 
Many diplomats complain that EU institutional balances have changed to the disadvantage of 
the development community. The European Foreign Minister and European External Action 
Service were clearly ideas driven by security concerns: while these initiatives are nominally 
designed to increase coherence between diplomacy and development policy, there are concerns 
in Brussels that their effect may be to restrict the role of the development community as an 
autonomous area of policy influence. After the June 2007 deal on a watered-down reform treaty, 
many in the development community still fret that the new, single European foreign policy chief 
is a ruse on the part of national leaders for ensuring a more strategically-directed use of the aid 
resources managed by the Commission. This fear is compounded by the judgement that by 
nature Javier Solana in practice has tilted far more towards crisis diplomacy and mediation with 
leaders than long-term reform issues.  
While the ESS and member states’ national security strategies have come to expect much more 
of development assistance, they have given the development policy-making community 
insufficient input into the elaboration of such policies. In Brussels, the ESS is recognised to be, 
in the words of one diplomat, ‘Solana’s baby’, an initiative from which the Commission 
deliberately “stepped back”. In this sense, many development policy-makers even judge the 
ESS to represent a reversal of the ‘gains’ made in the 2001 Gothenburg crisis management 
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initiative, which had moved towards greater development input. The effective demise of an 
autonomous Development Council is seen as having further weakened development input into 
strategic deliberations. A common judgement in Brussels is that Development Commissioner 
Poul Nielson was progressively excluded from policy deliberations after the September 11 
attacks and that, despite cultivating a higher profile, his successor Louis Michel has failed to 
reverse this trend. 
ESDP has brought with it a change in the general flavour of EU policy-making, with a power 
shift towards the Council and away from the Commission. Some member states and the 
development policy community have been critical of the fact that no more than very informal 
and sporadic consultation has been set up between the new ESDP machinery, on the one hand, 
and development policy forums and the Commission desks running existing third country policy 
initiatives, on the other hand. Commission officials lament a weakening of ‘civilian hold’ over 
EU security policy and judge ESDP/ESS to be less a boost to their own work than a “potential 
device for incoherente”.
32 Those perceiving civil society engagement to be integral to the EU’s 
civilian power model have viewed with concern ESDP’s apparent heralding of a less open 
decision-making process. There has been a shift of power towards security officials seconded 
from national capitals with no EU experience and little knowledge or appreciation of the 
approaches pursued through the Commission.  
In the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), counter-terrorism has assumed priority 
status, with little engagement from this body on development and governance issues.
33 As one 
Council official put it, “PSC likes to resolve things…[It is] not interested in long-term 
processes”. Debate has, for example, ensued within the PSC over expanding the scope of 
Petersberg tasks to include new funding allocations for ‘homeland security’. Observers 
highlight that the PSC, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Politico-Military Working 
Group of the General Affairs Council (PMG) have expressed minimal interest in or awareness 
of development issues.
34 Geographical desk officers and in-country diplomats have also been 
reluctant to let a new ‘development and democracy’ focus impede security engagement with 
autocratic regimes.  
The NGO development community has criticised what it judges to be the disingenuous use of 
conditionality, undermining engagement with the poorest sectors of society and the increasing 
tendency for aid to be channelled through, or in close association with, militaries. Most 
academic analysis has similarly admonished the EU for stretching the security-development link 
too far, in an effort to prioritise counter-terrorist and WMD aims that are not of primary 
relevance to Africa and sit uneasily with the EU’s traditional development actor identity.
35 
Unsurprisingly, Council officials see the persistence of divergent perspectives in a rather 
different light. They lament the fact that the development perspective is still too dominant in the 
EU’s external identity; that the Commission still ‘pours millions’ into development projects 
without any idea of their security impact; that there has been no effort to ‘educate’ development 
experts in security challenges; that talk of ‘tailoring’ regional development programmes to 
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security imperatives has produced no concrete results; and that the continuing inefficiency of 
Commission aid dispersal drastically undermines its security utility.  
5.  Governance: The link in the chain? 
Arguably, the most striking point of confluence between security and development objectives is 
to be found in an evolution of the governance agenda. For many years, development ministries 
have supported governance reform as a means of improving the effectiveness of pro-poor 
development. The EU’s security discourse has now come to make strikingly similar links 
between governance reform and strategic interests. Political liberalisation and better respect for 
human rights are said to be key to addressing the causes of international terrorism and ‘soft’ 
security concerns perceived to be a threat to Western countries. While a comprehensive survey 
of European support for democratic governance is beyond the scope of this paper, three basic 
points can be made in its relation to the security-development nexus. 
1) First, at least some increases in assistance for democratic governance have been forthcoming 
linked to conflict resolution commitments. The Commission’s 2001 conflict prevention strategy 
stressed a priority focus on good governance, the rule of law and ‘political inclusion’.
36 The 
EU’s new Strategy for Africa includes a Governance Initiative and an EU-Africa Forum on 
Human Rights.
37 Most crucially, €2.7 billion of the 10
th EDF (out of a total €22 billion for 2008-
13) have been set aside to be allocated as reward for those ACP states committed to cooperating 
with the EU on governance reforms.  
A common attempt to link governance elements into security policies can be seen across a 
plethora of different instruments. The budget for the Rapid Reaction Mechanism has gradually 
increased to over €30 million a year. The new Stability Instrument’s remit is based around a 
similar series of conflict-governance linkages. The ESDP rule of law missions in Georgia and 
Iraq pay perhaps the most direct testament to the perceived importance of governance issues 
within security engagements. In February 2007, a new EU police reform mission was agreed for 
Afghanistan.  
New resources have been made available from the European Initiative on Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) – this budget rising from €100 million before 9/11 to €132 million for 
2004. The 2002-05 EIDHR strategy was predicated on a far tighter link to conflict-related 
challenges. Of the 29 newly identified ‘target’ countries for democracy and human rights 
funding between 2002 and 2005, all but six were ‘conflict states’. The follow-on ‘EIDHRII’ 
will now increase, albeit modestly, such funding during the period 2008-13. 
The issue of Security Sector Reform is where the link between the governance, security and 
development agendas is seen most strikingly, especially though new SSR activities in Africa. 
By mid-2007, 26 African countries were receiving EU SSR funding. For example, the EU has 
moved towards taking the lead role on police and defence reform in the DRC. New EU SSR 
strategies were agreed by the Council in 2005 and by the Commission in 2006. Within the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the Commission and a number of EU 
member states have led new discussions on incorporating security sector assistance into 
development aid profiles. SSR aid has been presented as one of the most crucial concrete means 
of implementing the more holistic approach to security. The argument has been that security 
cooperation has moved away from traditional defence diplomacy to incorporate a focus that 
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enables engagement with militaries to improve ‘security governance’. The UK’s SSR strategy 
was elaborated jointly by the MoD, the FCO and DfID. It is this type of mid-level focus – 
distinct from both purely soft power and traditional concepts of hard power – that policy-makers 
commonly see as coming to embody a ‘European security identity’.  
More broadly, in May 2007 DfID launched a new strategy on ‘Governance, Development and 
Democratic Politics’, predicated upon a more explicit commitment to democracy support than 
hitherto. DfID opened a new Governance and Transparency Fund in February 2007, worth 100 
million pounds (€160 million) over 5 years, to go to civil society, media, unions and parliaments 
in developing states, all with the aim of linking citizens and the state. Aid expenditure is now to 
be based around a Country Governance Analysis carried out for each recipient state. The new 
strategy insisted that DfID was now more involved than previously with the FCO and MoD in 
devising strategies towards violent conflict, and that the Conflict Prevention Pools had begun to 
fund democratic reform projects in conflict situations – media projects in Uganda, political 
parties in Nepal, for example. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit has already funded 
institution-strengthening projects in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. An intra-Whitehall Africa 
Capacity-Building Initiative has been set up to coordinate governance assistance.
38  
The DfID-devised Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) is perhaps the most 
concrete initiative that seeks to give substance to the governance-conflict link, in line with 
recognition that the lack of transparency in the management of energy resources is a frequent 
trigger to conflict. Support for the EITI in the Niger Delta is presented by the UK as one its 
main links between development and security, for example. 
France has introduced a Governance Strategy that includes a commitment to devise a political 
reform strategy specifically for ‘fragile states’.
39 This suggests a hint of broader rethinking in 
French African policy. France has continued to move away (if haltingly, in the light of events in 
Ivory Coast and Chad) from its traditional bilateral military agreements in the continent, in 
search of a new identity for its beleaguered post-Rwanda/Zaire Africa policy. More of its aid 
now goes through the European Commission; more support is given for the Africanisation of 
military peacekeeping; and more emphasis has been placed on commercial links, especially with 
the big economies of Nigeria and South Africa, rather than solely on the cultural affinities of the 
traditional Francophone pré carré. The presidential campaigns of both Nicolas Sarkozy and 
Segolénè Royal suggested that France needed to design a more reform-oriented African 
policy.
40 
Despite such policy evolution and new initiatives, it must also be noted that overall governance 
commitments remain relatively limited. Funds allocated to supporting democratic governance 
account for a modest proportion of overall ODA. Definitional issues in this area present 
difficulties, but as a general rule it can be determined that few European donors allocate more 
than 3 or 4% of their development aid for political-governance projects. Funding for the judicial 
and police strands of counter-terrorism has increased by many times more than security-derived 
governance funding. The EU has been admonished for investing so little in democracy and civil 
society strengthening in emergency contexts and for making available such funding only well 
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into post-conflict scenarios.
41 While analysis of ‘new’ approaches to conflict resolution 
routinely emphasises the commitment to move away from ‘neutral’ humanitarianism towards an 
engagement with political reform issues, in practice EU humanitarian aid – direct, fire-fighting 
emergency provision through Western and not local NGOs – has in nearly all conflict states 
remained of several times greater magnitude than institution-building efforts. 
2) Second, it can be observed that the nature of European governance funding increasingly 
exhibits some measure of security concern. By far the largest share of European governance 
support focuses on building state institutions, in collaboration with partner governments. This is 
judged by policy-makers in part to reflect a desire for stabilisation through negotiated, 
consensual reform. This orientation is reflected also in the increasing preference for 
government-to-government aid and direct budgetary support; this type of aid remains many 
times greater than support for civil society, democratic procedures or countervailing powers 
against governments.  
In fact, the stabilisation-related aims behind governance assistance have diluted the genuinely 
reformist thrust of European funding. One prominent example of this is to be found in the 
support frequently given to the anti-corruption drives launched by leaders. These campaigns are 
invariably used and misused at the behest of leaders, in fact undermining a stronger 
institutionalisation of anti-corruption. Tony Blair’s support for (then) president Obasanjo was 
one of the best examples of this. The Nigerian leader was rewarded with a debt relief package 
pushed strongly by the UK – even when all of Nigeria’s broader governance indicators were 
worsening.   
Civil and political society actors in developing states most commonly criticise the EU’s 
governance assistance for being so heavily oriented towards government and state institutions. 
The Commission’s institution-building ‘indicators of achievement’ nearly all relate to 
strengthening the capacity and procedural efficiency of the state, not to democratic plurality.
42 
This betrays a model that often appears to be one of state-led development-and-security, rather 
than one aimed at encouraging meaningful political competition or dispersal of effective power.  
Analysts conclude that the EU still has some way to go to put in practice a concept of ‘human 
security’ that fully embraces human rights and individual participation in decision-making, as 
opposed to traditional state-oriented understandings of ‘political stability’.
43  
One of the central strands of DfID’s 2007 Governance strategy is a stated recognition that much 
technical governance support for state institutions has not provided benefits to development or 
security aims because it has neglected a more political understanding of democratic 
contestation. In the future DfID will, it is claimed, strike a better balance between state capacity-
building and strengthening accountability, for example through citizen participation in public 
expenditure controls. France’s new Governance Strategy insists that the French governance 
programme will also begin to move away from a purely state-oriented approach.  
In practice, EU approaches to conflict resolution have continued to focus most effort at the elite 
level. Highly engineered power-sharing deals have most commonly been favoured, that fail 
fully to address the roots of instability at the local level. One example is in the Great Lakes, 
where a concern in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi with balancing proportions of power to 
different ethnic groups has, according to critics, widened social cleavages at a local level. In 
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these cases, such a security model has led the EU to eschew support for multi-ethnic civil 
society groups, which might be the best positioned to maximise development potential. In the 
now fashionable terminology, insufficient attention has been paid to ‘bridging capital’, with too 
heavy a preference for intra- rather than inter-communal civil society-building – this adversely 
effecting both conflict and local development dynamics. 
While the SSR agenda has undoubtedly established itself more firmly as an area of concern 
since 9/11, in practice, assistance provided under a SSR label still includes much traditional 
defence diplomacy. Security cooperation incorporating good governance elements has in 
practice focused far more on enhancing the efficiency rather than accountability of armed forces 
in developing states. For example, the EU’s police mission in the DRC struggled to gain 
purchase on civil-military reform, as opposed to simply providing equipment and training; 
indeed, political corruption linked to donors’ DDR programme became so bad it was aborted.  
One practitioner laments that the EU has remained fixated on providing basic police assistance 
and training, to the detriment of looking seriously at the way in which broader security 
structures feed into conflict. 
The ‘security sector reform’ brief has so far taken on little concrete form in trying to check 
militaries’ political power in, for example, the Middle East. Many of the proposals under the 
Commission’s new Governance communication look like fairly standard counter-terrorism 
programmes, with little tangible reform aspects. Diplomats and some experts are minded simply 
to argue that boosting overall security capacity (not only of the armed forces, but also 
intelligence services, the police and border guards) tends to be a precursor to the development of 
greater accountability. Indeed, SSR work has been the subject of increasing divergence between 
Commission-based development experts and the Council: the formers’ focus on the 
‘parliamentary oversight’ of militaries has engendered tension with ESDP officials. Competence 
battles have intensified over whether security or development actors should deliver institution-
building aid relevant to the security sector. 
As the EU’s main focus has been on supporting African Union peacekeeping capacities, some 
have expressed concerns that the focus on, for example, strengthening Nigeria’s lead role in 
troop commitments to other African conflicts has militated against a focus on governance 
reform (especially of the security forces) within Nigeria itself. Some member states have wanted 
CFSP to gain firmer political control over these contributions to the AU. A delicate balance 
exists. One the one hand there is the risk of too much EU direction leading to resources being 
used for European security concerns and undercutting local ownership. On the other hand, there 
is the challenge of combining the principle of AU ownership with the negative implications that 
invariably result when those African militaries that are not subject to strong civilian control are 
unconditionally given more resources and power.  
The EITI is also still fairly limited in scope. Of 27 EU member states, only the UK, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands have signed up, with a number of states such as Spain actively 
resisting civil society pressure to join. A majority of member states have rejected the notion of 
attaching EITI-derived governance conditionality to EU development aid increases. Key 
producer states such as Angola have also rejected EITI – indeed EITI is most needed precisely 
where governments are flush with oil resources and thus assertive enough to rebuff the 
initiative. Moreover, EITI only covers the transparency of payments into national budgets. A 
government might be able to account for all payments from MNCs and MNCs to show that no 
bribes have been paid, but the underlying problem of patronage in the distribution of national 
budgets can proceed without censure. It is widely suggested that the ‘Publish what you pay’ 
campaign needs to be supplemented by a similar initiative on ‘Publish how you spend it.’ 20 | RICHARD YOUNGS 
3) Third, despite this security-conditioning of governance assistance, overall the good 
governance agenda remains more tightly linked to development policy-making than to strategic 
deliberation. EU political aid is most commonly aimed at giving poorest sectors of society better 
access to decision-making. A significant proportion of new EU governance funding aims at 
enhancing local organisational capacity specifically in relation to the provision of essential 
services. The use of human rights and civil society funds to support initiatives aimed at 
monitoring the budgets of local governments is an increasing and distinctive priority in EU 
strategies.  
Overall, most observers and policy-makers argue that many of the innovations linking human 
rights and post-conflict work to security have actually emerged from the development policy-
making community. These have filtered up into the EU’s ‘security conscience’ – in contrast to 
the US, where an evolving strategic vision has filtered down into other domains. If one moves 
down from the CFSP rhetoric on human rights or on institution-building and conflict 
prevention, and looks at the concrete aid initiatives carried out to further these goals, the EU has 
openly adopted an almost apolitical approach. The focus is on social capital, local-level 
decision-making capacities and civil society organisation around social issues.  
The feeling is still widespread that governance funding has retained its status as a relatively 
autonomous area of development activity, not in practice directed with strategic intent or logic. 
Indeed, the lack of knowledge of what exactly is being done within development and 
governance assistance programmes amongst security policy-makers remains striking. One 
common judgement in Brussels, national capitals and amongst analysts is that, rather than 
development funds being used in a directly political way (the initial fear of many and still the 
familiar NGO critique), political funds have been used in an indirectly developmental way.  
Indeed, some in the EP launched a debate on how the EIDHR had developed into an initiative 
funding small-scale civil society projects devoid of any linkage to CFSP priorities. (One of the 
largest EIDHR projects after 9/11 was in Bolivia, while Egypt was excluded as a target state, for 
example.) These MEPs sought to bring the management of these funds back under the purview 
of the EP, reverting in procedural structure to the origins of the Initiative in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the early 1990s. The ‘development lobby’ in the EP, along with the Commission, 
blocked such a reform. 
Moreover, the EU’s imposition of democracy-related sanctions has been sparing. There is no 
evidence of a massive security-driven use of punitive measures in a way that has interrupted 
long-term development support. Arguably, the imbalance in EU policy lies the other way 
around: the EU has tried to persevere with development aid, softening its political responses, 
even as conflict, corruption and collapsing state institutions have rendered such aid ineffective. 
The EP has criticised the EU for not contemplating firmer measures towards cases such as 
Ethiopia, Angola or Rwanda on these grounds.
44   
Additionally, EU institution-building efforts remain highly programmatic, and invariably does 
not dovetail tightly with the domestic political dynamics of partner states or comprehend well 
the shifting coalitions that lie at the root of conflict and instability. EIDHR funding procedures 
are so slow that the relevance of this initiative to moments – or the immediate aftermath – of 
crisis is widely questioned by local stakeholders.
45  
Again, the limitations that emerge from these three considerations can be witnessed in 
individual cases of conflict. UK engagement in Sierra Leone is often presented as a model of 
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integrated military-development-governance, but arguably its political reform elements have 
been disappointingly limited, and were (in the early- to mid-2000s) more about supporting 
Kabbah rather than broadening out political contestation. One expert argues that this reflects the 
UK’s unduly ‘statist’ approach to the conflict.
46 Basing a governance programme around Sierra 
Leone’s traditional Chieftancy structures, for example, has raised many eyebrows, given the 
way that this largely discredited system played into the original sources of Sierra Leone’s 
decade of civil conflict.
47 Public trust in the Sierra Leonean army remains low, in large part due 
to the latter’s political tutelage.  
In the Ivory Coast, France pushed the EU into offering president Gbagbo direct budgetary 
support, when other EU member states were already tiring of his apparent reluctance to 
introduce reforms; in return other EU states insisted on strengthening governance 
conditionality.
48 Governance was not identified as a priority sector for French aid. Other 
European donors also limited themselves to non-political work. After the postponement of 
elections in 2005, one EU diplomat summed up European policy with the suggestion that: 
“Ivory Coast needs a balance of power, not an alternance of power”.
49  
6. Conclusion 
Two questions emerge in this assessment of EU development-security linkages. First, whether 
these two policy areas do in fact look more ‘joined up’ than previously. Here, individual country 
cases demonstrate some progress, but also the limited articulation in practice of the 
development-security link. There are important cases where development efforts have been 
limited in conflict situations, and where security engagement has been limited in support of 
development challenges. Rather than designing genuinely merged and holistic policies, many 
diplomats are – in the words of one closely involved expert – still “chicken and egging” about 
whether development proceeds security or vice versa. 
The second question is: on whose terms is the development-security link being given impetus? 
Differences persist between member states over what the development-security link means in 
terms of policy evolution. Tensions have intensified between Brussels institutions. Each 
institution/ministry argues that its own area of policy competence is that which is intended to be 
most strengthened by the ‘security-development’ leitmotif. Asked how this link is advancing, 
development experts bemoan the primacy of security forums, while security experts perceive an 
imbalanced primacy of development perspectives.  
The blame for the lack of mutual comprehension lies on both sides: security experts can still be 
shockingly dismissive of the relevance of getting development and governance policies right; 
many in the development community still paint anything done in the field of security in an 
unremittingly negative light, as only prejudicial to their work. Views on the EU’s efforts to link 
development and security might be summarised by the maxim: where you stand depends on 
where you sit. 
Approaches have undoubtedly evolved in the governance domain, seen as the vital pivot 
between development and security policies. A number of European donors have moved towards 
elaborating more comprehensive governance strategies. Significantly, while support for 
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democratic governance and human rights is presented as crucial for both sustainable 
development and security, in practice it is an area of policy implemented in a way that is more 
in tune with the development than with the security agenda.  
More negatively, the EU risks conflating two different issues; on the one hand, the conditions of 
peace needed to foster economic development in poor states; and on the other hand, the question 
of the EU’s own security interests and how these may be enhanced through investment in 
development. If the EU is to attain durable ‘win-win’ linkages between development and 
security policies, it must now begin to invest this worthy dimension of policy coherence with 
greater conceptual precision. 
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